Reexamining Chinese Military Modernization from a Western Perspective
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Introduction

One can view history teleologically with the beginning point as tradition and the end point as modernity. In the 19th Century, Chinese thinkers and government officials had to figure out where their empire stood on that line. At stake was whether China could succeed in a changing environment and respond to internal threats and foreign incursions. The Qing Empire’s authority and legitimacy took a hard-hitting blow when her armies could not succeed over the internal Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). The Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) not only showed the Western powers’ ability to force concessions on China but also the superiority of a modernized military. In response to the Qing’s military failings during the 19th Century, military modernization became one of the first aspects of reform pursued by the dynasty. Military changes made it acceptable for reformers to look critically at other institutions and values that needed to be revised in response to military threats.

In the 19th Century, the internal and external threats against the Chinese empire forced her scholar-officials to formulate reforms to continue as a functioning empire. The reforms of the court had failed, and the Qing Empire was overthrown in a revolution in 1911 and replaced by a republic. Regimes generally implement policies to stay in power, but these reforms undermined the Qing’s own authority. The period from 1911 to 1929 was important because it displayed an attempt by the new Chinese republic to become a nation by means of modernizing the military. But before turning to the 1911-1929 period, I will provide important background information by looking at the end of the Taiping Rebellion in 1864 through the Tongzhi Restoration (1862-1874) to show the debate raging within China on modernization. This paper will show where the reform movement came from and the implications of using Western technology and thought. The paper will show how military reforms attempted to reconcile Western technology with Chinese tradition. Chinese officials allowed for the importation of Western hardware and for the hiring of foreign advisors with the following goals in mind: adequate response to the West and to Japan and emphasis on Chinese self-sufficiency. The military reforms represented a drastic departure from previous policymaking because they displayed the Chinese acceptance and borrowing of Western hardware and thought.

Methodology

“Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929” will show the extent of Western influence on Chinese equipment and supplies, imports and purchases, uniforms, conscription,
maneuvers, officers, and organization. This body of document was placed on microfilm by subject heading and covers consular and political affairs. Most of the documents came in memorandum form on an almost daily basis from the major cities in China to the State Department in Washington D.C. A file could hold different sources ranging from newspaper clippings, business letters, to an entire correspondence between US government officials.

**Background**

The Taiping Rebellion displayed the Qing Empire's inability to respond to the internal threat of the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace. This rebellion showed the state's military failures and the need for foreign support to put down this insurrection. Charles Gordon and Frederick Ward led the Ever Victorious Army over the Taipings and showed the superiority (and threat) of foreigners wielding autonomous power in China. From this experience, the Chinese became aware of the risk of using foreign officers and the need to keep Westerners subordinate to Chinese control.

Mary Wright, in her book *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism*, argued that in the critical 19th Century, Chinese officials acknowledged the advances of the West in the technical world, as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Chinese scholar-officials in the Tongzhi Restoration attempted to strengthen the Chinese state by means of industrialization from above. Tseng Kuo-fan and other officials saw the importance of modern ships and strove to develop a navy on their own, as exemplified by the Yangtze Navy. The Kiangnan Arsenal displayed China's short-lived success at manufacturing her own modern arms and effort “to make the foreigners’ special skills China’s special skills.” The Kiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Shipyard exemplified how Chinese officials responded to the purely technical problems of a modern army and navy by establishing their own arsenals. The Chinese officials in the self-strengthening movement tried to build modern armaments with minimal foreign assistance and lay the foundation for the full-scale military modernization in the post-1911 period.

Wright analyzed the debate between conservatives who resisted change and reformers who wanted to transform either the empire's industrial aspects and/ or the cultural aspects. The Tongzhi Restoration allowed for changes within the technical world in defense of Confucius culture and values. After the Taiping Rebellion was put down, the Chinese began to allow the importation of Western hardware to strengthen the Chinese military but on the condition that

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2 Wright, Pg. 211.
3 Wright, Pg. 211.
4 Wright, Pg. 212.
this temporary aid should remain under Chinese control. These reformist officials initiated industrialization from above and allowed for the introduction of Western, modern armaments. The Tongzhi Restoration was only the first of two phases of reforms in response to the West. Although it implied weakness on the part of China, the self-strengthening of Tongzhi acknowledged that China could improve if she learned from the West.

Only after China's humiliating loss to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) did the majority of scholars allow for the acceptance of not only hardware but also Western thought and initiatives. Reformers like Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yan Fu in the 1898 Reforms (Hundred Days of Reform) looked to Western ideas and philosophy to drastically alter the Chinese mind. Although the Empress Dowager Ci Xi put down the Hundred Days of Reform and ended the reform movement, the downfalls of the Qing Empire later on in 1911 led to an acceptance of Western machinery and thought.

Enlightened officials realized that the technological superiority of the West was closely associated with its unique political and social institutions. In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West by Benjamin Schwartz argued that Chinese thinkers not only had to acknowledge the empire's industrial deficiencies but also their cultural inferiority to modernized states after the humiliating loss to Japan in 1895. Schwartz analyzed the case of one Chinese reformer during and after the 1898 Reform Movement. The scholar Yan Fu saw how China attempted to modify the hardware and protect the Chinese culture in the Tongzhi Restoration yet failed to match up with the West and with Japan. Yan Fu argued that China needed to recognize the superiority of Western culture and thought. He attempted to reconcile Western and Chinese ideologies by showing how indigenous values called for the acceptance of Western political theory and scientific breakthroughs. Most importantly, Yan Fu wanted China to value the notion of "nationhood" in higher regard than traditional values. Chinese intellectuals also recognized the necessity for military modernization, within the Confucian framework. Although many conservative officials used Confucianism to maintain the status quo, Yan Fu tried to show how traditional Chinese values called for the individual quest for modernity. He described individuality as a total "renunciation of the self," a devotion to the interests of the state, and a concern for the public interest over one's own. Yan Fu argued that the virtue of individuality would benefit the individual, the national society, and the state. In order to combine Chinese tradition with modernity, Yan Fu used the Buddhist

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5 Wright, Pg. 214.
6 Wright, Pg. 52.
8 Schwartz, Pg. 9.
9 Schwartz, Pg. 167.
10 Schwartz, Pg. 140.
idea of “self-denial” and Confucius emphasis on hard work, education, and discipline. Yan Fu’s ideas showed a concern for the common people, similar to Confucius’ central value of humanism. Yan Fu, and other thinkers, used Confucianism to defend the revolutionary drive towards modernity. Yan Fu used Confucianism to defend his notion of the individual by arguing that Chinese tradition legitimated change and called for people to change, for the sake of protect the people.

Power and Politics in Late Imperial China by Steve MacKinnon displayed how the technical changes of the Tongzhi Restoration and the technical and cultural reforms during the 1898 Reform Movement allowed the Chinese official Yuan Shikai to make drastic changes in the military. Strong regional leaders like Yuan Shikai created “new armies” that were modern and not completely under the control of the Qing government. Yuan Shikai organized the Beiyang Army to be well-disciplined and trained in arms and organization, according to Western standards. The “new armies” arose out of the incompetence of existing armies, were regional and therefore decentralized, and were outside of the traditional forces. Ralph Powell showed how these new armies were molded on the external embellishments as opposed to basic principles; for example the Chinese were impressed by the precision of Prussian drills rather than the fundamentals of Western strategy and tactics. Neo-Confucianism preached the unity of theory and practice, and so Chinese thinkers needed to investigate the thought and technology of the West in order to succeed. When the Qing Empire fell and later with the death of Yuan Shikai, the regionalism of the new armies gave birth to the chaotic warlord period in China. Yuan Shikai, a Chinese official, led the way for modernization by initiating a number of military schools and new armies.

Military leaders in the warlord period (1916-1928) ruled China and fought amongst themselves. Some warlords sincerely worked for the unification of the Chinese nation under a federal government; some for their own political power; and some occupied territories to make themselves rich. The warlord period gave birth to the arms race between warlords and the demand for new arsenals, new weapons, and new advisors. Foreign advisors were employed by the central government and by rival warlords in competing regions of the state. For example, Admiral Shen Hung Lie, unwilling to join the Nanking

12 Ibid., Pg. 70.
15 Dorsay to MacMurray, Aug. 22, 1929. File No. 893.30/49, General Records of the Department of State, RG69 (National Archives) henceforth labeled GRDS.
government, drew funds from Manchurian sources to employ Captain Henry Revel, a retired officer of the French Navy.16

**Military Hardware**

The military hardware aspect of China's modernization will cover these following themes. China accepted modern machinery from the West in order to modernize her military against all threats. Chinese officials imported and copied Western technology and subordinated foreign advisors in order to guarantee her place in the modern world. The US government wanted to arm China in the interests of American businesses and to counter the influence of other powers, especially Japan.

The Chinese began to borrow military hardware from the West in hopes of creating a modern army. Chinese officials imported waterproof blankets and uniforms to make their military battle-ready and more effective.17 From England, the Chinese imported dryers, oilers, willeys, dreadnaughts, carders, and milling machines.18 These officials bought thirty-six looms from England and the necessary chemicals from Germany for use of these machines.19 The Chinese began to study and copy the technology even though reproducing these machines cost more money than importing the goods from the West. They attempted to produce Chinese-made hardware as a matter of pride and self-sufficiency. The Chinese allowed for the initial importation of military hardware but proceeded to copy and reproduce this machinery as quickly as possible for the purpose of self-reliance and keeping up with Western technology.

The Chinese continued to import and copy Western technology at extremely high expenses. The Te Chow Military Arsenal consisted of a powder factory and a cartridge factory and exemplified China's headstrong effort in modernizing her technology. The powder factory manufactured smokeless "cotton" powder, similar to French smokeless powder and used a large amount of imported materials from Germany.20 The cartridge factories of the Arsenal consisted of 25 to 30 homemade machines used for punching discs from bars.21 The machines in the general shop of the factories emulated imported equipment, and one of these machines copied Japanese and German technology to a workable level.22 The successful innovation and the wholesale attempt at emulating Western technology displayed a high level of complexity, accuracy

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16 Ibid.
17 Gale to Calhoun, April 25, 1910, File No. 893.20, GRDS.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Alexander Jr. to Knox, April 29, 1913. File No. 893.2421/3, GRDS.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
and fine adjustment by the Chinese. These machines all possessed military purposes that China needed to reproduce in the hopes of surviving in a modernizing world. This type of ceaseless, exhaustive searching of things to strengthen China exemplified how Chinese scholar-officials reconciled Chinese tradition with modernity. The individual could move toward advancement through an amalgamation of intellect and Confucius virtues like hard work and service to the people.

The Chinese requested the most advanced Western technology in military weaponry in order to resist foreign enemies and fight rival warlords. General Liu, Chief of Staff under the Kiangsu military governor in 1922, asked the US Consulate for assistance in purchasing an American-made anti-aircraft gun. He also wanted a full description and explanation of modern AA guns to train his own junior officers. Not only did General Liu request an advanced military apparatus but wanted to understand modern machinery to eventually become self reliant. General Chang Tso-lin requested contacts to purchase machine guns and ammunition. This request may be even more informative because General Chang Tso-lin used the threat of turning to the Bolsheviks for supplies in order to coerce American assistance. Connecting to the Neo-Confucian principle of the exhaustive investigation of things and the unity of theory and practice, these abovementioned examples illustrated how Chinese officials could reconcile Western hardware and instructions with traditional Chinese values.

After the 1911 Revolution and the ensuing warlord period, the Western powers agreed on an arms embargo on all groups in China in hopes of an end to internal hostilities on the part of the Chinese warlords without foreign intervention. Unfortunately, many nations circumvented this arms embargo by means of secrecy and/ or cleverness. The US War Department and Consul-General in Canton abetted in the purchase of 1,000 revolvers for the Canton police in 1926. US government officials defended this arms deal by claiming that it encouraged the overall protection of law and order and had nothing to do with the political strife in China. The US government also allowed the purchase of 7,000 rifles to be used against bandits and for the protection of the Hunan railroad. US civil servants wanted the Chinese governor to centralize power in the province and protect the railroads, the symbol of modernity in the region. The United States defended these arms deals with nonpolitical aims like law and order and modernity but really used these terms as a veneer for protecting US government and private business interests in arming the Chinese.

23 Ibid.
24 Hanson to Knox, April 19, 1922. File No. 893.24/13, GRDS.
25 Ibid.
26 Hanson to Knox, April 19, 1922. File No. 893.24/13, GRDS.
27 Ibid.
28 MacMurray to Knox, March 11, 1926. File No. 893.243, GRDS.
29 Myers to MacMurray, April 9, 1926. File No. 893.243, GRDS.
Arms sales between the US and China reflected the interests of private business; the US government’s desire for a balance of power in East Asia; and China’s desire to play the powers against one another to get the military hardware she needed. US government officials wanted China to modernize her armies in order for her to counter Japan and to reflect the private sector’s desire to sell equipment to this gigantic market. America was aware of Japan’s growing strength and ambitions in East Asia and did not want the Japanese to have an imperialistic relationship with China. American officials also felt discouraged by how Japan asserted claims to Manchuria and China’s iron deposits. During World War I when the European powers were occupied with the Great War and only Japan and the United States expressed interest in selling weapons, US officials wanted to supply the China with weapons to keep the Japanese from receiving military contracts. The American government allowed a Chinese group consisting of a Lieutenant General and Rear Admiral to visit the United States in order to inspect private munitions plants and to encourage a reliance on the Chinese for US supplies. Drysdale, the US Military Attaché in Peking, wanted a strong, modernized China to compete against Japan and keep her in check. There existed a high level of Chinese awareness of diplomacy and ability to play the great powers against one another. The US government wanted to introduce American rifles, machine guns and calibers of ammunition to China. Otherwise, the standard Chinese firearms may become Japanese and increase the demand for Japanese supplies. Churchill, US Military Attaché, requested an expert Ordnance officer to be sent to China for arms purchase assistance and further revealed the US government’s goals in China. Churchill explained in this memo that private enterprise only pursued profit, and so he requested a government official for the underlying principle of assistance to China. Although one cannot definitively state the power of these officials to implement their memos and ideas, these government memos showed a real concern for China to modernize militarily, along with the private sector’s interests in sales. This type of military buildup of China with US means would also be sound, proper, and profitable business for private, US companies.

American firms wanted to sell equipment and arms to the Chinese and lobbied the US government to allow them unfettered access and arms deals. The president of the American Fore River Shipbuilding Company sent a letter to the US Department of State regarding a 213,000 pounds sterling Chinese contract

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30 Reinsch to Knox, Nov. 24, 1917. File No. 893.24/6, GRDS.
31 Daniels to Baruch, Nov. 22, 1917. File No. 893.24, GRDS.
32 Ibid., and Letcher to Baruch, Nov. 29, 1917. File No. 893.24/5, GRDS.
33 Drysdale to Milstaff, August 23, 1919. File No. 893.2421/8, GRDS.
34 Drysdale to Milstaff, August 23, 1919. File No. 893.2421/9, GRDS.
35 Ibid.
36 Churchill to, Sept. 2, 1919.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
with the British Vickers Sons & Maxim Company. The English business provided the Chinese government a training ship on which officers could become familiar with English-type Naval fittings. The American company was concerned that England would familiarize Chinese officials and young officers with the latest English type of ordnance and ammunition, thus creating a familiarity with and prejudice towards all British-type Naval fittings. The Chinese benefited from this contract because her soldiers would become acquainted with very modern armaments while the English benefited because of the additional sales. Fourteen years later, the H.M. Newhall and Company similarly sent a letter to the Department of State informing the government of their desire to sell the Chinese government horse saddles, military uniforms and army tents. These letters reflected how American firms showed a deep concern and lobbied the American government to protect their interests in a time of huge military buildup in China.

The interests of the US government and US businesses went hand in hand without any conflict of interest. The US Army wanted to sell the Chinese government a supply of cotton breeches no longer needed by this government. Alexander Jr., the agent from the US Department of Commerce and Labor, moved into the private sector and represented Pratt & Whitney Company in China. He helped in the acquisition of a $1,000,000 (USD) contract between China and Pratt & Whitney for the purchase of machines and the manufacture of modern army rifles. Overall, one Department of State official recommended the cooperation of the Chinese and American War Departments in order for the US to reorganize the entire Chinese military establishment.

A Department of State official concluded that around the year 1925, China was inundated with foreign munitions. From Russia, China received armaments valued at around five million Mexican dollars. China also received about 11,200 cases of munitions from either Germany or France. China opened herself to military technology as a result of the reforms in the nineteenth century that revealed her failures. Chinese officials hired foreign advisors to help with technical matters but always kept them in a subordinate role and did not allow them run wild as in the Taiping Rebellion. Also, the great power politics played a decisive role in foreign governments allowing their businesses to sell weapons to China.

39 President of Fore River Shipbuilding Co. to See, May 7, 1910. File No. 893.34/14, GRDS.
40 Bowles to Knox, May 7, 1910. File No. 893.34, GRDS.
41 Ibid.
42 H.M Newhall and Company to Dept. of State, Sept. 29, 1924. File No. 893.24/19, GRDS.
43 Young to Knox, Oct. 9, 1928. File No. 893.246/1, GRDS.
44 Alexander Jr. to Knox, April 14, 1914. File No. 893.24211, GRDS.
45 Drysdale to Milstaff, Sept. 13, 1919. File No. 893.2421/9, GRDS.
46 Stanton to Mayer, May 13, 1925. File No. 893.24/28, GRDS.
47 Ibid.
48 Thomas to Mayer, May 5, 1925. File No. 893.24/27, GRDS.
Previously, traditional officials made China resist modernity, but through the efforts of thinkers like Yan Fu and reformers like Yuan Shikai and Tseng Kuo-fan, many officials in the post-1911 period could legitimize modernity as protecting, and not drastically changing, Chinese culture. The traditional culture made China resist modernity because of its differences with Western philosophy on the nature of government and the responsibilities of individuals. The Five bonds of Confucianism called for unquestionable deference and respect to the higher authority while Western science depended on a healthy amount of cynicism and questioning. Therefore, reformers like Yan Fu extended the Confucian notion of filial piety from the father figure to the state and further used the virtue of ren (humanism), Chinese Legalism, and also Zhu Xi’s self-cultivation to propagate change. Some elements of traditional Chinese culture resisted modernity, but assiduous thinkers synthesized traditional philosophy to defend modernization and moved China on the path of modernity.

**Foreign Advisors**

The Chinese employed foreign advisors to improve the abilities of her armies. As a result of an agreement between the Western powers not to get involved in the turmoil of the warlord period, the Chinese could only employ Western officers as employees but not as official envoys from the foreign governments. Many advisors were engaged in a strictly business relationship that explicitly placed them under Chinese superiority and other contractual duties. The Sino-British Naval Agreement sent Chinese officers to acquire practical and theoretical knowledge in Britain in order to emulate Western military thought. Foreign advisors played a large part in China’s sincere effort to modernize.

In 1910, the Imperial Chinese Commissioners looked at an array of nations like Italy, France, England, Germany, Austria and Russia to copy their naval organization, ship-building plants, and arms manufacturing. In 1926, a group of twenty-four observers visited Russia to learn from the Red Army detachments and military academy. This group also established ties with the Soviet leadership and studied the military structure. The Soviet Union was the model of a successful national-liberation movement that China could emulate. Chinese officials emulated modern machinery from England, powers from France, and even the Soviet military structure.

The numerous examples of a Chinese effort to modernize and emulate represented the ceaseless, exhaustive searching for progress that could be reconciled with Neo-Confucianism’s self-cultivation. Sun Yat-sen looked to the

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49 Charge d’Affaires to Knox, Feb. 19, 1910. File No. 893.30/28. GRDS
50 Coleman to Knox, Oct. 23, 1926. File No. 893.2361, GRDS.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Japanese model of emulating the West in order to modernize. Sun was impressed with the ability of British instructors to greatly improve the efficiency of the Japanese navy.  He specifically wanted advisors in administrative organization, navigation, gunnery, and torpedo instruction.  He preferred American advisors as a result of their high level of modernity and less threatening posture to China but would be open to Japanese instructors. The Chinese appointed British Captain B.W.S. Pritchard as Commander of the Training Ship Hwah Jah and chief instructor to the Chinese cadets in 1924. China turned to the West, and to an extent to Japan and the Soviet Union, in order to find her place in the modernizing world. These examples further illustrated how China was beyond the position of complete denial in hopes of correcting her mistakes.

China needed technical experts to install equipment and for the actual management of operations. Chinese officials wanted to reorganize one arsenal with US experts as a learning experience and proceed to alter all of China's other arsenals under a Bureau of Arsenals. The Chinese also employed German and Belgian experts in a powder factory in Honan to increase output but fired the German experts in the course of World War I. The Chinese employed General Sutton, a British advisor, to manage the arsenals in Tsinan and Tientsin and to enlarge the Mukden Arsenal. General Sutton supervised the construction of a trench mortar and shell factory in Mukden and succeeded in administrating the production of 2,000 shells per day. Also, Chinese officials hired former railway employees of British origin for their skills and knowledge of British railroad technology applicable to China.

The employment of foreign advisors produced mixed results in the beginning years of military modernization. In Nanking, several German and Japanese instructors trained the armies while British advisors instructed in the naval college. The Nanking Consul observed that the new methods of drill made the new army much more efficient than the old because of the new German and Japanese battle methods. On the other hand, an army of 6,000 in the Foochow area suffered from poor discipline and efficiency even with four advisors.

53 Schurman to Knox, May 8, 1922. File No. 893.30, GRDS.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Cunningham to Schurman, Jan. 30, 1924. File No. 893.30/26, GRDS.
57 Drysdale to Milstaff, Sept. 7, 1919. File No. 893.2421/8, GRDS.
58 Drysdale to Milstaff, Aug. 23, 1919. File No. 893.2421/8, GRDS.
59 Phillips to Sec. of War, May 4, 1918. File No. 893.24/7, GRDS.
60 Gauss to MacMurray, Oct. 12, 1925. File No. 893.2421/21, GRDS.
61 Mason to Knox, Sept. 25, 1925. File No. 893.2421, GRDS.
62 Gauss to MacMurray, Oct. 12, 1925. File No. 893.2421/21, GRDS
63 Consul of Nanking to Knox, Feb. 20, 1911. File No. 893.20/14, GRDS.
64 Ibid.
Japanese advisors. Military drills according to the advice of foreign officers did not bring modernity instantaneously to China, even with all their best efforts. Chinese officials made an effort to subordinate foreign advisors as employees, at the risk of slower industrial growth. A German advisor to a powder factory wanted full control of the plant in Chengtu, Szechwan after workers' negligence led to an accident. Even though the Chinese wanted to industrialize as quickly as possible, the Chinese employers refused to give too much authority to foreigners because they understood the potential of abuse and overall disregard of the wishes and orders of the officials. Steve MacKinnon's book displayed how General Burgevine was a threat to the Chinese court, and so after the Taiping years the Chinese always strove for a commander who only considered his subordinate duty to China. Chinese leaders learned their lesson from the captains of the Ever-Victorious Army in the Taiping Rebellion and always made a conscious effort to keep foreign advisors inferior. Chinese wanted to work on a strictly business relationship with foreign advisors/employees.

The cases of Charles Dolan and G.W. Northridge exemplified how the Chinese employed foreign advisors on a strictly business relationship with contractual duties. Dolan and Northridge were American pilots hired to train Chinese soldiers at a flying school. The Chinese wrote a strict contract that allowed the Chinese to terminate the employees at any time. The men were placed under Chinese law and had to keep all matters confidential and secret. The Chinese superiors could fire Captain Dolan if he disregarded any orders and for any other acts perceived as insubordination. The officials consciously kept the advisors subordinate in order to avoid the risky relationship the Chinese had with previous advisors during the Taiping Rebellion. Unfortunately, the American pilots did not bring much progress to aeronautical training as a result of defective planes. The cases of Dolan and Northridge displayed many themes that reverberated during the China's early twentieth century: the memory of past dealings, subordination of advisors ensuring proper equipment and knowledgeable advisors from the West, and the overall necessity for additional modernization in order for China to be nation-state.

The Sino-British Naval Agreement established a delegation of British advisors to China and a group of Chinese cadets to Britain in 1930, after the end of the warlord period and the unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek's

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65 Nightingale to Knox, July 13, 1910. File No. 893.201, GRDS.
66 Smith to Director of Far Eastern Affairs. March 14, 1910. File No. 893.2421/16, GRDS.
67 MacKinnon, Pgs. 301-309.
68 Alexander Jr. to Knox, April 14, 1914. File No. 893.2421, GRDS.
69 Yen to Schurman, Nov. 2, 1921. File No. 893.248, GRDS.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
KMT. The agreement called for a naval mission of British advisors to create a substantial navy in China. The British officers received ranks in the Chinese military: Commander in the Royal Navy held the rank of Captain in the Chinese Navy; Lieutenant Commander of the Royal Navy became Commander in the Chinese Navy; and others. This agreement put an end to the arms embargo and reflected a respect to the KMT, China’s republican government, on the part of the British government. This agreement was another step on China’s path to modernity as an equal nation-state on the modern global stage.

The Sino-British Naval Agreement also sent a delegation of twelve Chinese midshipmen and eight sub-lieutenants for training in Britain. Many non-western states sent their young men abroad to learn the methods and principles of military warfare of the more modern nations. All of the Chinese cadets were under the age of 23 and possessed English writing and reading skills to a competent level. The requirements to be selected as part of this delegation included a good general education and technical knowledge of machines. The Chinese cadets received British uniforms to be worn while in Britain. The Submarine Boat Corporation set up a special school and trained ten or twelve Chinese naval officers in the construction and handling of modern submarines.

The British government set up a rigorous education schedule for the group of Chinese cadets. The agreement stipulated that the midshipmen would spend one term at the Royal Naval College and then three terms in practical training on the H.M.S. Erebus. These cadets would also receive practical education while they spent twelve months on a real fleet. Four special midshipmen would then complete another year in His Majesty’s Fleet and qualify in gunnery, signals and wireless telegraphy, engineering, and torpedo use. The other eight midshipmen would go to the Royal Naval College for additional coursework. The sub-lieutenants would take technical courses at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. The Chinese cadets would then be able to lead and train their Chinese counterparts in the British theory of modern warfare. China not only attempted to emulate the military hardware but also gained the theoretical knowledge for a modern military. During this time

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74 Davies to See, July 2, 1929. File No. 893.30, GRDS.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
period, the Chinese also approached the Germans, like Max Bauer, for military assistance, revealing an effort to learn from both sides of the conflict in Europe.

The Department of State records from 1910-1929 offered many cases of foreign advisors being employed in China to help in the military modernization. The beginning cases displayed mixed results, but these cases would be important to exemplify the progress made by the 1920's. The Sino-British Naval Agreement illustrated how Chinese soldiers would go abroad to cultivate their military learning and bring back the knowledge to strengthen the Chinese nation. Chinese nationalism and experience in the Taiping Rebellion gave birth to the determination to subordinate foreign advisors and to achieve military self-sufficiency. China's military modernization effort resulted from the following causes: the threat of imperialism, the necessity to be superior to foreigners, the inability to respond to internal rebellion, and the traditional Chinese value of self-cultivation.

Conclusion

Chinese military modernization turned into industrial modernization and the progression of China as a whole. The Kiangnan Arsenal progressed from a small engineering plant in its beginning in 1867 to an extensive arsenal and Naval Dockyard by 1925. The Kiangnan Arsenal produced merchant ships, the manufacture of railway, and other materials. The Chinese government converted the Shanghai Arsenal into an industrial factory for private business. The Canton Arsenal worked day and night under the control of a civilian governor, Ch'ien Ch'iu-ming, and without any foreign advisors. In the twentieth century, China continued to modernize her military and went further to reform her industrial sectors. The reconciliation of Chinese tradition and Western thought and hardware allowed for the transformation of the military and then China's industry as a whole.

The reforms of the nineteenth century allowed Chinese leaders to borrow Western technology and advisors to strengthen the Chinese state. Chinese officials accepted modern machinery from the West in order to modernize her military against internal and external threats. They needed foreign advisors but put them in a subordinate relationship because of the Chinese tradition of superiority over foreigners. The United States sold weapons to China regardless of the arms embargo because of the pressure from private companies and in hopes of competing against other foreign powers. The period of 1911-1929

86 Editorial from P & T Times Feb. 4, 1925. File No. 893.2421/18, GRDS.
87 Ibid.
88 Wai to Netherlands minister, Jan. 17, 1925. File No. 893.2421/18, GRDS.
89 Wyeer to Knox, June 16, 1921. File No. 893.2421/13, GRDS.
revealed the transformation of the mindsets of Chinese leaders as they accepted Western thought, military machinery, and advisors.